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Abstract 
 
The closed economy neoclassical model predicts lung-run convergence in per-capita income. We 
show, within a neoclassical framework, that international trade among two countries differing 
only in their initial capital endowment generates long-run income differences. Our results 
suggests that trade creates opposite incentives to accumulate capital. Transitionally, the returns to 
investment with trade are smaller for countries initially less endowed with capital as when 
compared to their autarchic situation, while the reverse happens for those countries most 
endowed with capital. Thus, countries starting with relatively less (more) capital end, in the long 
run, with less (more) capital than in autarchy. 
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1. Introduction
The closed economy neoclassical version of the Ramsey model predicts that the level of capital
stock to which a country converges is independent of its initial stock. Hence, countries that differ
only in their initial levels of capital stock should converge to the same steady state and, consequently,
share common levels of income in the long run. This prediction is based on the assumption of
autarchy, and may not occur when countries engage in international trade. It is well known that
the large discrepancies in income levels among countries can be attributed to the point in time at
which countries started a sustained growth regime (Galor, 2005). A country’s integration into world
markets is often identified as an important contributor to its ability to sustain growth, although this
point of view has its skeptics (Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2001). Others have attributed discrepancies in
income levels among countries to a number of factors such as policies, savings rates and technology
(Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002). Whereas the literature on endogenous growth has highlighted the
importance of initial conditions on long-run capital and consumption levels (e.g. Lucas (1988)
and Caballé and Santos (1993)), the theory of international trade (Stolper and Samuelson (1941))
suggests that if factors of production are not equally distributed among individuals, international
trade will influence a country’s distribution of income. Since factors of production are not equally
distributed across countries, one might ask: will international trade alleviate or exacerbate income
differences across countries in the long run? Others have posed similar questions. For example,
Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) ask: How does the timing of a country’s development relative to that
of the rest of the world affect the path of a country’s development?
Our paper is related to the work of Chen (1992), in that we focus on two countries that are not in
long-run equilibrium using a Heckscher-Ohlin-like structure. He considers a two-country two-good
dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model. He includes a leisure-work decision choice in the utility function
and ascertains that if consumers have relatively small discount factors, long-run income levels across
countries will differ, depending on their initial conditions. Ventura (1997) focuses on conditional
convergence among countries using a two-sector growth model in which intermediate products
are traded internationally. He shows that convergence of per-capita output is affected by the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) consider a world
economy consisting of a continuum of small countries that trade intermediate inputs internationally.
Capital is employed in the production of intermediate products and, in turn, intermediates are
used to produce two non-internationally traded commodities, investment and consumption goods.
Countries differ in technologies, savings and economic policies. To avoid with specialization they
employ the Armington specification. They demonstrate that rich countries are those that have
low discount factors, create incentives to invest and have better technologies. Mountford (1998)
employs an overlapping-generations model with two countries, and shows they converge to different
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income levels if consumers’ time rates of discount vary across countries. Bajona and Kehoe (2006)
analyze the discrete time version of Ventura’s model and presume that consumption and investment
are identical composites of two trade goods. Using a logarithmic utility function and assuming that
capital fully depreciates in a single period, they demonstrate that initial conditions influence long-
run per-capita income and that parameter values affect the distribution of income per-capita across
countries over time.
Overall, our work more closely parallels that of Atkeson and Kehoe. They focus on a single
country, in the presence of the rest of the world, that has converged to its long-run equilibrium.
They find that the timing of a country’s development, relative to the rest of the world, affects the
path of that country’s development. A country that has technologies and inter-temporal preferences
as the rest of the world, but begins the development process with a capital-labor ratio lower than
that of the rest of the world —a late bloomer—ends up with a permanently lower level of income
than early-blooming countries. By not focusing on two or more countries that remain in transition
to long-run equilibrium, Atkeson and Kehoe’s analysis cannot draw inferences regarding differences
in countries’ transition paths, nor can they infer whether these paths are unique and converge to a
unique steady state.
We consider a world economy of two countries, neither of which have converged to their long-
run equilibrium. The countries produce two commodities, an investment good and a perishable
consumption good. Consumers have identical preferences and identical discount factors, and derive
satisfaction from consuming the perishable consumption good. Hence, countries only differ in their
initial capital endowment. Restricting our analysis to the non-specialization case, we prove within
the framework of a neoclassical model that different initial capital stock endowments are sufficient
to generate long-run income differences across countries. We show that in state space the set of
steady states is a ray, and demonstrate that, depending on initial conditions, economies converge
to a point on this ray. In other words, different initial endowments of capital can lead to long-run
differences in capital, consumption and income across countries. We find that while the steady-state
world capital stock is unique, our two otherwise identical countries may converge to different levels
of capital stock. We demonstrate that the early bloomer (i.e. the country with a higher initial level
of capital) converges to a higher long-run level of capital stock than the late bloomer, and the early
bloomer’s level of capital is higher than that the level obtained in autarchy. The early bloomer enjoys
a higher level of consumption and, if the capital-producing sector is capital intensive, its pattern
of trade is to export the capital-intensive good and import the perishable consumption good. The
savings rate of the early bloomer can be higher than that of the late bloomer–a difference which can
persist in the long-run. These results suggest that the role played by initial capital stocks in many
growth divergence/convergence studies is likely to be more complex, and that per-country capital
endowments as a proportion of world capital may also be relevant to analyze growth divergence/
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convergence across countries.
In the next section, the two country - two sector world economy is described, and key results are
derived. We then restrict the parameters of the model so as to yield constant savings rates in each
country to make more explicit and reinforce the results obtained in the previous section. Our model
demonstrates that the late bloomer’s returns to capital accumulation are always larger in autarchy
than under international trade, whereas the early bloomer’s returns to capital accumulation are
always smaller in autarchy. With international trade, the price of the investment good is determined
by the world’s per-capita capital, and the rental price of capital must in turn be influenced by
changes in the price of the investment good in a Stolper-Samuelson fashion. The late bloomer
has a smaller per-capita capital than the world’s per-capita capital, while the inverse holds for the
early bloomer. International trade must therefore have an opposite effect on the returns to capital
accumulation for early and late bloomers. Consequently, in transition, the late bloomer’s terms of
trade favor the non-capital intensive good, thus inducing this country to save less when compared
to autarchy. The formal analysis suggests that international trade negatively (positively) influences
the net returns to the capital of the late (early) bloomers, regardless of factor intensities. The early
bloomer converges to a capital stock that is larger than would otherwise prevail in autarchy, since
it has greater incentives to accumulate capital, while the late bloomer ends up with less capital
than in autarchy. With trade, the early bloomer postpones consumption. In this way, consumption
levels diverge in the long run.
To further confirm our analytical results and to provide insights into rough orders of magnitude,
solutions are obtained to an empirical model for the case in which both countries remain within their
cone of diversification. The results show transition paths corresponding to different country levels
of initial capital stocks and corresponding different steady-states. Trade is shown to generate
long-run differences of more than 35 percent in capital stocks across countries, depending upon
differences in initial capital stocks.
2. The 2x2x2 economy.
The world economy consists of two countries, each of which employs capital and labor using
constant elasticity of substitution technologies to produce a capital good Yxj and a perishable
consumption good Ycj that are internationally traded. Each economy consists of a representative
individual. Consumers’ preferences are identical across countries, and are characterized by a con-
stant elasticity of intertemporal substitution
¡
θ−1
¢
utility function and discount future utility of
consumption at rate ρ > 0 (also presumed to be identical across countries). At the beginning of
time, each economy j is endowed with an identical amount of labor, Lj, but their endowment of
capital Kj (0) , can differ. We call the late (early) bloomer the country that starts with a relatively
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smaller (larger) initial endowment of capital. To isolate the effect of different initial capital endow-
ments, we do not consider technological change or population growth. Furthemore, the countries
are not permitted to hold each other’s assets.
2.1. Consumers’ optimization problem.
The instantaneous utility of consumption cj in the j-th country is given by
U (cj) =
⎧⎨⎩
c1−θj
1−θ if θ 6= 1
ln cj if θ = 1
(1)
where θ > 0. The consumer of country j (for j = 1, 2) chooses paths of consumption cj (t) , and
assets Kj (t) given prices to solve
max
Z ∞
0
U (cj (t)) e
−ρtdt (2)
subject to
K̇j (t) =
(wKj(t)−δp(t))Kj(t)+wLj(t)Lj−cj(t)
p(t)
(3)
where the endowment of labor is normalized to unity (Lj = 1). The j-th country’s rental price
of capital and labor wage rate are denoted by wKj (t) and wLj (t) , respectively, and δ is the
constant and common rate of capital depreciation. Since the consumption and investment goods
are internationally traded, their prices are equal across countries. The price of the investment good
at instant t is denoted by p (t) , and the price of the consumption good is treated as the numéraire.
The first-order and transversality conditions of problem (2) are given by
c−θj =
λj
p
, λj
µ
wKj
p
− δ − ρ
¶
= −λ̇j , lim
t→∞λj (t)Kj (t) e
−ρt = 0 for j = 1, 2 (4)
where λj is the co-state variable associated with the constraint (3) (to avoid notational cluster, we
omit expressing variables as a function of time unless needed for clarity). The Euler condition of
the consumer of country j is therefore given by
ċj
cj
=
1
θ
Ã
− λ̇j
λj
+
ṗ
p
!
=
1
θ
µ
wKj
p
+
ṗ
p
− δ − ρ
¶
for j = 1, 2. (5)
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2.2. Firms
The technologies for producing the investment and consumption good are, respectively,
Yxj = A
³
αK
γ
xj + (1− α)Lγxj
´ 1
γ
, Ycj = Q
³
βK
γ
cj + (1− β)Lγcj
´ 1
γ
(6)
where Kij and Lij denote the capital and labor services employed in the production of output
i = x, c in country j = 1, 2. Subscripts x and c denote the investment good and consumption good,
respectively. 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, α 6= β are distribution parameters. A and Q are positive
constants and −∞ < γ 5 0, that is, we consider the case in which capital and labor are necessary
for production. Let 11−γ ≡ χ denote the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
We presume no factor intensity reversals and, therefore, assume γ to be equal across goods.
Profit maximization in each sector implies
Kxj =
µ
αAγp
wKj
¶χ
Yxj, Lxj =
µ
(1− α)Aγp
wLj
¶χ
Yxj, (7)
Kcj =
µ
βQγ
wKj
¶χ
Ycj , Lcj =
µ
(1− β)Qγ
wLj
¶χ
Ycj
Using (6) and (7) , we obtain the zero profit condition that output price equals marginal cost given
by
p =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
A
µ
αχ
w
γχ
Kj
+ (1−α)
χ
w
γχ
Lj
¶− 1
γχ
for γ < 0
Ā−1wαKjw
1−α
KLj
for γ = 0
, 1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
Q
µ
βχ
w
γχ
Kj
+ (1−β)
χ
w
γχ
Lj
¶− 1
γχ
for γ < 0
Q̄−1wβKjw
1−β
KLj
for γ = 0
(8)
where Ā = αα (1− α)1−αA and Q̄ = ββ (1− β)1−β Q.
Definition.- An equilibrium are paths of quantities cj (t) , Kj (t) , Yij (t) , Kij (t) , Lij (t) and
prices wKj (t) , wLj (t) and p (t), such that, given prices, cj (t) and Kj (t) solve the optimization
problem (2) of the consumer of country j for j = 1, 2. Given prices Kij (t) and Lij (t) , for i = x, c
and j = 1, 2 solve the profit maximization problem of sector i in country j, and the following market
clearing conditions are satisfied:
Market clearing for labor and capital in each country requires
Lcj (t) + Lxj (t) = Lj = 1 (9)
7
Kcj (t) +Kxj (t) = Kj (t) (10)
The international market clearing for the consumption good is given by
Yc1 (t) + Yc2 (t) = c1 (t) + c2 (t) = C (t) (11)
where C (t) denotes world consumption. Market clearing for the investment good equals
Yx1 (t) + Yx2 (t) = x1 (t) + x2 (t) (12)
where xj (t) equals
xj (t) = K̇j (t)− δKj (t) . (13)
2.3. Solution
In the absence of specialization, factor price equalization occurs and thus wKj = wK and
wLj = wL. Equation (8) defines wK and wL in terms of the price of the investment good. More
specifically,
wK = WK (p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ω
1
γχ
³³
1−β
Aγpγ
´χ − ³1−α
Qγ
´χ´− 1
γχ
for γ < 0
³
Q̄
− 1
1−β
¡
pĀ
¢ 1
1−α
´ (1−β)(1−α)
α−β
for γ = 0
(14)
wL = WL (p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Ω
1
γχ
³³
α
Qγ
´χ − ³ β
Aγpγ
´χ´− 1
γχ
for γ < 0
³
Q̄
− 1
β
¡
pĀ
¢ 1
α
´ βα
β−α
for γ = 0
(15)
where Ω ≡ αχ (1− β)χ−βχ (1− α)χ. Wf (p) for f = K,L are used to denote the relation between
the rental price of factor f and the price of the investment good p. Note that the sign of Ω determines
which sector uses capital (labor) intensively in its production. If Ω > (<) 0, the investment good
production uses capital (labor) intensively. As in the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade,
if the investment (consumption) good uses capital intensively in its production and the price of the
investment good increases (declines), then the rental price of capital increases and the labor wage
rate declines.
Using the market clearing condition for labor and capital, we obtain the j-th country’s supply
of investment and consumption goods, respectively, given by
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Yxj =
(1− β)χwχKKj − βχwχLLj
AγχpχΩ
, Ycj =
αχw
χ
LLj − (1− α)χwχKKj
QγχΩ
(16)
Market clearing in the consumption good implies
C = c1 + c2 =
αχw
χ
L (L1 + L2)− (1− α)χwχK (K1 +K2)
QγχΩ
(17)
which implicitly defines the price of the investment good p. Equation (17) and
ċ1 =
1
θ
µ
wK
p
+
ṗ
p
− δ − ρ
¶
c1, (18)
ċ2 =
1
θ
µ
wK
p
+
ṗ
p
− δ − ρ
¶
c2, (19)
K̇1 =
(wK − δp)K1 +wLL1 − c1
p
, (20)
K̇2 =
(wK − δp)K2 +wLL2 − c2
p
, (21)
form a system of four differential equations and one static equation in five variables c1, c2, K1, K2
and p, which together determine an equilibrium solution. Note that wK , wL can be substituted out
employing (14)− (15) .
2.4. Steady states
If a steady state exists within each country’s cone of diversification, the Euler condition of both
countries implies
1
θ
µ
w∗K
p∗
− δ − ρ
¶
= 0 ⇒ w
∗
K
p∗
≡ r∗ = δ + ρ (22)
where the superscript ∗ denotes steady-state values. We denote the ratio w∗K
p∗ as the rental rate of
capital r∗. Using (8) , and setting p∗ = w
∗
K
r∗ , the steady-state rental price of capital and labor wage
rate are, respectively, given by
w∗K =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Q
Ã
(1−β)χ
³
r∗
A
´γχ−Ω
(1−α)χ
! 1
γχ
for γ < 0
Q̄
³
δ+ρ
Ā
´ 1−β
1−α
for γ = 0
, w∗L =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Q
Ã
(1−β)χ
³
r∗
A
´γχ−Ω
( r
∗
A )
γχ−αχ
! 1
γχ
for γ < 0
Q̄
³
Ā
δ+ρ
´ β
1−α
for γ = 0
(23)
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The price of the investment good at the steady state is
p∗ =
w∗K
r∗
(24)
Setting (20) and (21) equal to zero, solving for c1 and c2, and substituting c1 and c2 into (17) gives
the steady-state levels of capital in countries one and two, as the combinations of capital stocks K∗1
and K∗2 that satisfy the following equation
K∗2 =
αχ (w∗L)
χ −ΩQγχw∗L
(1− α)χ ¡w∗K¢χ +ΩQγχ ¡w∗K − δp∗¢L−K∗1 (25)
where L is the world labor supply (L = L1 + L2 = 2) . If these economies were closed, they would
converge to the same steady state. In the presence of trade, values for K∗1 and K∗2 satisfying
equation (25) determine a steady-state solution.
The steady-state level of consumption in each country equals the total factor returns,
c∗j = ρp
∗K∗j +w
∗
L for j = 1, 2 (26)
Clearly, if K∗1 6= K∗2 , then consumption across countries differs in the steady state.
The steady-state levels of production in each country are given by
Y ∗xj =
(1− β)χ (w∗K)χK∗j − βχ (w∗L)χ Lj
Aγχ (p∗)χΩ
for j = 1, 2 (27)
Y ∗cj =
αχ (w∗L)
χLj − (1− α)χ (w∗K)χK∗j
QγχΩ
for j = 1, 2 (28)
Notice that only the combinations of (K∗1 ,K∗2) satisfying
µ
α
1− α
w∗L
w∗K
¶χ
> (<)
K∗j
Lj
> (<)
µ
β
1− β
w∗L
w∗K
¶χ
for α > (<)β (29)
represent steady-state equilibria within the cone of diversification and that the combinations of
(K∗1 ,K∗2) satisfying (25) are an infinite connected set. Next, we show that the segment of the ray
(25) satisfying (29) is a self-attracting manifold.
3. Convergence
To facilitate the analysis of the model’s convergence properties, the system is reduced to three
differential equations. Using standard techniques, we show that the economies can converge to
different steady states depending on their initial conditions.
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3.1. Transforming and reducing the system
A difficulty one encounters when analyzing the asymptomatic properties of system (17)− (21)
is that equations (18) and (19) contain the term ṗ
p
. We, however, do not have direct information
on this term. To analyze the asymptotic properties of the model it is useful to use the co-state
variables and their differential equations obtained from (4) as follows1
λ̇1 =
µ−wK
p
+ δ + ρ
¶
λ1, (30)
λ̇2 =
µ−wK
p
+ δ + ρ
¶
λ2, (31)
K̇1 =
(wK − δp)K1 +wLL1
p
− 1
p
µ
p
λ1
¶ 1
θ
, (32)
K̇2 =
(wK − δp)K2 +wLL2
p
− 1
p
µ
p
λ2
¶ 1
θ
(33)
where p is implicitly defined by (17) and wK and wL can be substituted out using (14) − (15) .
Since the steady state is a manifold of dimension one, at least one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix of system (30) − (33) must be zero. Indeed, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the
Jacobian matrix of (30)− (33) has a zero eigenvalue.
It is easiest to derive the convergence properties of the model by reducing the dimensionality
of the dynamic system (30)− (33) . Since the countries’ Euler conditions are identical, the ratio of
their consumption levels c1/c2 is constant throughout transition to the steady state. Let this ratio
equal some constant μ > 0. Using c2 =
³
p
λ2
´1
θ
, equation (4) implies
c1 + c2 = (μ+ 1) c2 = (μ+ 1)
µ
p
λ2
¶ 1
θ
. (34)
Equation (17) can therefore be rewritten as
G (p, λ2,K1,K2) =
µ
λ2
p
¶ 1
θ
µ
αχw
χ
L (L1 +L2)− (1− α)χwχK (K1 +K2)
QγχΩ (μ+ 1)
¶
= 1 (35)
Suppose (po, λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2) satisfies G (p
o, λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2) = 1. Presuming differentiability, the Im-
plicit Function Theorem implies the existence of a function P (λ2,K1,K2) defined on an open ball
B about (λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2) such that
1Note from (4) that cj =
³
p
λj
´ 1
θ
.
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G (P (λ2,K1,K2) , λ2,K1,K2) = 1 for all (λ2,K1,K2) ∈ B, (36)
and
∂P (λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2)
∂q
= −Gq (p
o, λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2)
Gp (po, λ
o
2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2)
for q = λ2,K1,K2 (37)
where Gq (p
o, λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2) denotes the partial derivative of G with respect to q evaluated at ( p
o, λo2,
Ko1 , K
o
2) satisfying G (p
o, λo2,K
o
1 ,K
o
2) = 1. Using
c1
c2
= μ and c2 =
³
p
λ2
´ 1
θ
, we can therefore reduce
the equilibrium conditions to a system of three differential equations in three dynamic variables λ2,
K1, and K2 as follows:
⎛⎜⎜⎝
λ̇2
K̇1
K̇2
⎞⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(−wK/P (λ2,K1,K2) + δ + ρ)λ2
((wK − δp)K1 +wLL1) /P (λ2,K1,K2)− μ
³
P (λ2,K1,K2)
1−θ /λ2
´ 1
θ
((wK − δp)K2 +wLL2) /P (λ2,K1,K2)−
³
P (λ2,K1,K2)
1−θ /λ2
´ 1
θ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(38)
where p = P (λ2,K1,K2) is implicitly defined by (35) , and as before wK , wL can be replaced by
using (14)− (15) .
3.2. Convergence properties
From Li et al. (2003), we know that the system (38), a system of a lower dimension, preserves
the dynamic properties of the original system (30) − (33). Note that any combination of the
state variables (K1, K2) satisfying (25) and (29) constitutes a steady-state equilibrium. We now
demonstrate that the segment of the ray (25) satisfying (29) is saddle path stable. This implies
that different initial conditions of the state variables (K1 (0) , K2 (0)) may lead to a different steady
state.
These results lead to two claims.
Claim 1. Different initial conditions of the state variables K1 and K2 can asymptotically
lead to different steady-state values of K∗1 and K∗2 whose sum satisfies a unique world value K∗ =
K∗1 +K∗2 .
Claim 2. At each steady state (K∗1 , K∗2) there is a neighborhood containing a one-dimensional
manifold convergent to a point on the ray of steady states at (K∗1 , K∗2) such that for all initial
conditions (K1 (0) , K2 (0)) of this one-dimensional manifold, the equilibrium path converges expo-
nentially to (K∗1 , K∗2) .
Proposition 1. (Convergence) The Jacobian matrix of (38) evaluated at a steady state has
a negative eigenvalue and two positive eigenvalues.
Proof. See Appendix¥
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Since the set of steady states is a ray of dimension one (25) and the Jacobian matrix of (38) has
a negative eigenvalue and two positive eigenvalues, from Li et al. (2003) it follows that claims 1 and
2 hold. Provided initial conditions are in the neighborhood of a steady states it also follows that for
each steady state (K∗1 , K∗2) there is a unique path with different initial conditions converging to
(K∗1 , K∗2). Note that a steady state is not stable in the sense that if we disturb this steady state by
providing more capital to one of the economies, the countries converge to a different steady state.
Corollary 1. Countries that start with different initial endowments of capital end up with
different income levels.
Proposition 2 The gap between the consumption shares of the two countries at any point in
time t is determined by the difference in initial capital endowments.
Proof. Since consumption grows at equal rates across countries, the share of per-country
consumption in aggregate consumption, C (t) = c1 (t) + c2 (t) , is constant,
φj =
cj (t)
C (t)
(39)
Integrating each country’s budget constraint and employing the transversality condition, we obtain
φ1 − φ2 =
p (0) (K1 (0)−K2 (0))
C (0)θ lim
t→∞
R t
0 C (τ)
1−θ e−ρτdτ
¥
(40)
If the utility function is logarithmic, U (cj) = ln cj, the difference in consumption across countries
at time zero equals
c1 (0)− c2 (0) = ρp (0) (K1 (0)−K2 (0)) (41)
Another implication of equation (41) is that the more impatient countries are, (ρ large), the
larger the consumption of the country with the largest initial capital stock. Thus, ifK1 (0) 6= K2 (0) ,
consumption across countries will differ transitionally and at the steady state. The country that
starts out with the largest capital endowment will forever enjoy higher consumption levels. The
consumption ratio of country one and two is given by
φ1
φ2
= μ =
K1 (0)C (0)
−θ p (0) +
R∞
0 C (τ)
−θ wL (τ) e−ρτdτ
K2 (0)C (0)
−θ p (0) +
R∞
0 C (τ)
−θ wL (τ) e−ρτdτ
(42)
Corollary 2. With international trade, the country that starts with the smallest initial cap-
ital endowment will have a steady-state consumption level lower than its steady-state autarchy
consumption level.
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Proposition 3 The gap between the level of countries’ capital stock in the steady state is
determined by the difference in initial capital endowments.
Proof. Substituting (26) into (40) we obtain
K∗1 −K∗2 =
p (0)
ρp∗
C∗
C (0)θ
Ã
K1 (0)−K2 (0)R∞
0 C (τ)
1−θ e−ρτdτ
!
(43)
where C∗ denotes world consumption at the steady state, equalling
C∗ =
(1− α)χ (w∗K)χ (
w∗L)
p∗ + α
χ (w∗L)
χ ρ
(1− α)χ (w
∗
K)
χ
(p∗) +Q
γχΩρ
L¥ (44)
It follows that the country with the largest initial endowment of capital converges to a steady-
state capital stock that is larger than that of the other country. Compared to the steady-state level
of capital in autarchy, with trade the country that started out with the largest initial endowment of
capital will surpass the steady-state autarchy level of capital, while the other country asymptotically
converges to a capital stock that is lower than the level it obtains in autarchy.
The differences in country capital stocks imply differences in the pattern of production. From
(16) it is straightforward to verify that if production of the investment good is relatively capital
intensive, α > β, then the country with the largest initial stock of capital produces larger amounts
of the investment good relative to the other country, while the other produces a larger amount of
the consumption good.
Next we look at an analytical solution to the model under a restriction in parameter values2.
In particular, this restriction in parameter values for the closed economy two-sector Ramsey model
leads to the two-sector model by Uzawa (1963) of constant savings rates (as in the Solow model
(1956)).
3.3. Analytical solution
Consider a particular solution of the model presented in Section 2.
Proposition 4. If
ρ = δ (α+ β (θ − 1))− δ, α+ β (θ − 1) > 1, γ = 0 (45)
then the world has a constant savings rate from the world income equal to s = 1
θ
3.
2ρ = δ (α+ β (θ − 1))− δ, γ = 0.
3Note that α+ β (θ − 1) > 1 requires θ > 1.
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Proof. See Appendix¥
Proposition 5. Let K (0) denote the world’s initial capital endowment (K (0) = K2 (0) +
K1 (0)), and let κj (0) = Kj (0) /K (0) . For (45) , the share of each country’s consumption in total
consumption is given by
φj =
µ
β − 1− α
θ − 1
¶µ
κj (0)− Lj
L
¶
+
Lj
L
(46)
=
µ
ρ
δ
1
θ − 1
¶µ
κj (0)− 1
2
¶
+
1
2
Proof. See Appendix¥
Since θ > 1 must hold under (45) , the term
³
ρ
δ
1
θ−1
´
is positive. Since we have assumed that
each country has the same endowment of labor,
Lj
L
= 12 , it follows from (46) that the country with
the largest proportion of initial capital (κj (0) > 1/2) will have a share in aggregate consumption
of at least 1/2. This country then benefits proportionally more than the other country from the
larger initial capital endowment, and the relative benefit depends upon the magnitude of ρ
δ
1
θ−1 > 0.
Not surprisingly, the more consumers discount future utility of consumption (large ρ) and the more
consumers are willing to intertemporally substitute consumption measured by θ−1, the greater the
benefit from having a larger initial endowment of capital. This benefit, however, is negatively
affected by the size of the rate of capital depreciation (δ).
Proposition 6. If (45) holds, transitionally the net returns to capital accumulation ( (wK + ṗ) /p−
δ) with international trade are:
i) lower for the late bloomer, and
ii) larger for the early bloomer
when compared to their respective autarchy case, regardless of sectoral factor intensities.
Proof. See Appendix¥
Thus, an early bloomer’s stock of capital is larger in the long run than in autarchy, since it has
greater incentives to accumulate capital, while the late bloomer ends up with less capital than in
autarchy. Since the early bloomer has greater incentives to save under trade than under autarchy,
with trade it postpones consumption. Since the early bloomer postpones consumption and tends to
save in the short run, in the long run it enjoys higher consumption levels than in autarchy, while
the inverse happens for the late bloomer. In this way, consumption levels diverge in the long run.
Proposition 7. If (45) holds, transitionally the labor wage rate wL is:
i) larger for the late bloomer, and
ii) lower for the early bloomer
when compared to their respective autarchy case, regardless of sectoral factor intensities.
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Proof. See Appendix¥
Thus, the results of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade also hold. In
particular, if factors of production are not equally distributed across a country’s individuals, inter-
national trade has income distribution effects.
The restriction (45) also implies other regularities in the evolution a country’s share of capital
stock and savings.
Proposition 8. Given (45) , the ratio κj (t) = Kj (t) /K (t) is constant for all t and
κj =
Kj (t)
K (t)
=
Kj (0)
K (0)
(47)
Proof. See Appendix¥
The restriction (45) implies a constant world saving rate, but not necessarily identical saving
rates across countries. Let sj (t) denote the share of savings from income for the j-th country.
Proposition 9. Given (45) , the j − th country has a constant savings rate and moreover, if
K1 (0) 6= K2 (0) then
s1 6= s2. (48)
and the rate sj is given by
sj =
δ
[δ ((1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1))]
³
Lj
L
K(0)
Kj(0)
´
+ δ + ρ
for j = 1, 2 (49)
Proof. See Appendix¥
Consequently, (49) indicates that the country with the larger initial capital stock will also have
a higher saving rate4. Whereas the capital stock of country j positively affects its own saving
rate, the other country’s capital endowment negatively affects country j’s saving rate. This result
contrast other literature showing that different savings rates are the result of differences in discount
factors across countries (Mountford, 1998, Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002).
4. Some simulations
For illustrative purposes, we numerically solve the model, assuming the following parameter
values:
δ = .05, ρ = .02, θ = 3, α = 0.5, β = 0.3, γ = 0, A,Q = 1
4 ∂sj
∂Kj(0)
Kj(0)
sj
=
sj
δ
[δ ((1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1))] Lj
L
( K(0)
Kj(0)
− 1) > 0
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To simulate the model we employ the relaxation algorithm for solving continuous time, multi-state,
infinite-horizon differential systems developed by Trimborn et al. (2006).The left plot of Figure
1 displays a phase diagram of the countries’ capital stocks. We consider four different cases in
which the initial capital stock of country one differs (the horizontal axis), keeping the initial capital
endowment of country two (the vertical axis) equal across simulations. The solid line is used to
identify the base simulation, where the capital stock of country one equals 3.4 and the initial
capital stock of country two equals 4. The other three simulations differ by subsequent decreases
in the initial capital stock of country one by about six percent less than the previous simulation
or subsequent decreases of 0.2 units of capital compared to the base simulation. Steady-state
values are denoted by *. For comparison purposes, the triangle (N) shows the autarchy level of
steady-state capital stocks. We have also plotted the ray of steady states.
Figure 1. Phase diagram and ratio between capital stocks
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Figure 1 confirms claim one that the economies converge to different steady states depending on
initial conditions. In particular, the country that starts with the largest capital stock also converges
to a capital stock that is larger than that of the other country. The country that starts with the
largest capital stock also converges to a capital stock that is larger than the capital stock obtained
in autarchy, while the opposite happens for the other country. The diagram on the right plots the
evolution of the ratio of country two’s capital stock to country one’s capital stock. Countries remain
within their cone of diversification so that specialization does not occur (see Figure 2). The right
diagram in Figure 1 shows that the model with trade can generate long-run differences of more
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than 35 percent in capital stocks across countries.
Figure 2. Production Y1c, Y1x, Y2c and Y2x
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Figure 3 plots income ratios for the four simulations performed. Long-run income differences
range from appoximately 5 to 11 percent.
Figure 3. Income ratio ((Y2c (t) + p (t)Y2x (t)) / (Y1c (t) + p (t)Y1x (t))
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When simulating the model, the possible set of parameter values to choose from is very large
because estimates of parameter values vary considerably across studies5. Nonetheless, we want
to test the sensitivity of the analytical results presented in section three to different parameter
values. Figure 4 presents the simulation results for the net returns to capital under autarchy and
under trade, assuming that the initial capital stocks of country one (the late bloomer) and country
two (the early bloomer) equal 3.4 and 4, respectively. The parameter values we have chosen are
indicated in the top-left graph (Case 1) in Figure 4. The other graphs in Figure 4 (Cases 2 to
6) are simulations with different parameter values from those presented in Case 1. The different
parameter values from those of Case 1 are indicated in each plot. For example, Case 3 considers
the elasticity substitution between labor and capital to be equal to χ = 0.9, while the remaining
parameters are as indicated in Case 1.
Figure 4. Net returns to capital (
wK(t)
p(t) +
ṗ(t)
p(t) − δ)
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Figure 4 confirms our analytical results that, regardless of factor intensities, the net returns to
capital with international trade are transitionally smaller for the late bloomer, and larger for the
early bloomer compared to their autarchy case. Thus, when compared to autarchy, in the short
5For example, estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
¡
θ−1
¢
vary from approximately 0.06 to 2
(see for example Hall (1988) and Mulligan (2002)).
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run, with trade the early bloomer has larger incentives to save while the opposite happens for the
late bloomer. With trade, therefore, the early bloomer postpones consumption. Whereas in the
short run, the consumption levels of the early bloomer are smaller under trade than in autarchy,
the reverse happens for the late bloomer (see Figure 5). This implies that in the short run the
consumption levels of the two countries are more similar (tend to converge) with trade. Since
the early bloomer postpones consumption, in the long run it consumes more than in its autarchic
situation. Thus, while in the short run consumption levels tend to converge with trade (compared
to the autarchy situation), with trade long-run consumption levels diverge (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Consumption under trade and autarchy
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In Figure 6 we present the ratio of country two’s income to country one’s income. Interestingly, when
the production of the investment good is capital intensive, in the short run international trade (the
solid line) widens the income gap between the two countries, compared to autarchy (the dashed
line). Case two is the exception, which corresponds to the case when consumption uses capital
intensively in its production. These simulations indicate that policy, in particular international
trade policy, has a very distinct effect on consumption and income convergence (a situation in
which consumption or income are more similar across countries). In the cases considered here,
international trade always yields consumption convergence in the short run. When capital is used
intensively in the production of the investment good international trade generates income divergence
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across countries not only in the long run also even more so in the short run.
Figure 6. Income ratios
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5. Conclusions
Large discrepancies in income levels among countries can be attributed, in part, to the conditions
at the starting point of the growth process. Those who start the process later, the late-bloomers, are
typically characterized as having lower capital to output ratios than the early bloomers. The closed
economy neoclassical version of the Ramsey model predicts that a county’s long-run equilibrium is
independent of its initial capital. If countries are integrated, according to our findings, they may
not converge to similar capital and per-capita income levels in the long run. We consider a world
of two open and competitive economies that produce an investment good and a perishable good.
The economies only differ in the level of their initial capital stock. The early bloomer (the country
whose initial capital stock exceeds that of the other country) is shown to converge not only to a
higher level of capital than the late bloomer, but also to an amount that exceeds its autarchy level.
In particular, we show that in state space, the set of steady states is a ray and demonstrate that,
depending on initial conditions, the economies converge to a point on this ray. In other words,
different initial endowments of capital can lead to long-run differences in capital, consumption and
income across countries. These and corollary results are shown for the general case and, more
specifically, for the case in which the model’s parameters are restricted to allow a constant savings
rate.
Our explanation of why international trade generates consumption and capital divergence in the
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long run is as follows. Since the late bloomer has less capital than the early bloomer, in autarchy
the late bloomer’s returns to capital must be larger than the early bloomer’s returns to capital.
With international trade, the price of the investment good must be determined by the world’s
per-capita capital, and the rental price of capital must in turn be influenced by changes in the
price of the investment good in a Stolper-Samuelson fashion. Since the late bloomer has a smaller
per-capita capital than the world’s per-capita capital while the inverse holds for the early bloomer,
international trade must have an opposite effect on the returns to capital accumulation for early
and late bloomers. In particular, international trade must negatively (positively) influence the net
returns to the capital of late (early) bloomers. With trade, the early bloomer converges to a capital
stock that is larger than would otherwise prevail in autarchy, since it has greater incentives to
accumulate capital, while the late bloomer ends with less capital than in autarchy. With trade, the
early bloomer postpones consumption. In this way, consumption levels diverge in the long run.
Future research may deal with the issue of whether or not allowing for international borrowing
and lending leads to equalization of income across countries.
6. Appendix
6.1. Proof of proposition 1 (Convergence)
The Jacobian matrix of (38) equals
J∗ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Λ ∂P
∂λ2
¯̄̄
∗
Λ ∂P
∂K1
¯̄̄
∗
Λ ∂P
∂K2
¯̄̄
∗
H1
∂P
∂λ2
¯̄̄
∗
+ 1
θ
1
p∗
c∗1
λ∗2
H1
∂P
∂K1
¯̄̄
∗
+ ρ H1
∂P
∂K2
¯̄̄
∗
H2
∂P
∂λ2
¯̄̄
∗
+ 1
θ
1
p∗
c∗2
λ∗2
H2
∂P
∂K1
¯̄̄
∗
H2
∂P
∂K2
¯̄̄
∗
+ ρ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(50)
where ∂P
∂q
¯̄̄
∗
denotes the derivative of P with respect to q = λ2,K1,K2 evaluated at a steady state
and
Λ =
Ã
w∗K −
dWK (p)
dp
¯̄̄̄
p=p∗
p∗
!
λ∗2
(p∗)2
=
Ã
1− dWK (p)
dp
¯̄̄̄
p=p∗
p∗
w∗K
!
w∗Kλ
∗
2
(p∗)2
=
µ
Ω
w
γχ
K
−
µ
1− β
Aγpγ
¶χ¶ wγχK
Ω
w∗Kλ
∗
2
(p∗)2
using (14) and factoring
w
γχ
K
Ω
= −
µ
1− α
Qγ
¶χ wγχK
Ω
w∗Kλ
∗
2
(p∗)2
solving for −
µ
1− β
Aγpγ
¶χ
from (14) (51)
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where WK (p) is the relation between the rental price of capital and the price of the investment
good, as indicated in equation (14) .
Hj =
Ã
dWK
dp
¯̄̄̄
p=p∗
− δ
!
Kj
p∗
+
dWL
dp
¯̄̄̄
p=p∗
Lj
p∗
(52)
−(w
∗
K − δp∗)K∗j +w∗LLj
(p∗)2
− 1− θ
θ
c∗j
(p∗)2
for j = 1, 2
envelope properties of aggregate output of country j (Ycj + pYxj) imply
6
Hj = − 1
(p∗)2
µ
Y ∗cj +
1− θ
θ
c∗j
¶
for j = 1, 2 (53)
and the derivatives of P (λ2,K1,K2) are given by (37) . Note that since
∂P
∂K1
= ∂P
∂K2
, the Jacobian
matrix (50) can be rewritten as
J∗ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
J∗11 J∗12 J∗12
J∗21 J∗23 + ρ J∗23
J∗31 J∗32 J∗32 + ρ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (54)
where J∗ih is the row i and column h element of matrix (50). One can readily verify that any matrix
like that indicated in (54) has an eigenvalue equal to ρ. Let ε be an eigenvalue of matrix (54) . The
characteristic equation of (54) equals
(J∗11 − ε) [(J∗23 + ρ− ε) (J∗32 + ρ− ε)− J∗23J∗32] (55)
−J∗12J∗21(J∗32| {z }
a
+ ρ− ε) + J∗12J∗23J∗31| {z }
b
+ J∗12J
∗
21J
∗
32| {z }
a0
− J∗12J∗31(J∗23| {z }
b0
+ ρ− ε)
= (J∗11 − ε) [(J∗23 + ρ− ε) (J∗32 + ρ− ε)− J∗23J∗32]− J∗12J∗21 (ρ− ε)− J∗12J∗31 (ρ− ε) .
The terms a and a0 and b and b0, respectively cancel each other. By inspection, it is easy to see
that if ε = ρ, then (55) equals zero and therefore ε = ρ is one of the eigenvalues of matrix (54) ,
which is positive.
Further, notice that
6Please ask authors for detailed derivations if required.
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H1 +H2 = −
¡
Y ∗1c +
1−θ
θ
c∗1
¢
(p∗)2
−
¡
Y ∗2c +
1−θ
θ
c∗2
¢
(p∗)2
= − C
∗
θ (p∗)2
(56)
where C∗ = c∗1 + c∗2 and
∂G (p∗, λ∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2)
∂K2
≡ G∗K2 = −
1
(μ+ 1)
µ
λ∗2
p∗
¶ 1
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QγχΩ
= − 1
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and
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∂λ2
≡ G∗λ2 =
1
θ
1
λ∗2
(58)
Using (56)− (58) , we obtain
− (H1 +H2)G∗K2 =
C∗
θ (p∗)2
G∗K2 = −
1
θ
(w∗K)
χ
(p∗)2
(1− α)χ
QγχΩ
= ΛG∗λ2
⇒ ΛG∗λ2 =
C∗
θ (p∗)2
G∗K2 (59)
Using (56)− (59) , the Jacobian matrix (50) can be rewritten as
J∗ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
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Next we find the determinant of the Jacobian matrix (we first operate on matrix (54) to avoid
notational cluster)
detJ∗ = J∗11 [(J
∗
23 + ρ) (J
∗
32 + ρ)− J∗23J∗32]− J∗12J∗21(J32| {z }
a
+ ρ) + J∗12J
∗
23J
∗
31| {z }
b
(61)
+J∗12J
∗
21J
∗
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a0
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∗
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∗
32 + ρ)− J∗23J∗32]− J∗12J∗21ρ− J∗12J∗31ρ
= ρ (J∗11 (J
∗
23 + J
∗
32 + ρ)− J∗12 (J∗21 + J∗31))
Making appropriate substitutions from (60) and simplifying using (56) we obtain
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Substituting for G∗K2 from (57) , we get
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multiplying and dividing by w∗K and simplifying
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A
¶γχ
− 1
¶
+
(1− β)χ
Ω
µ
r∗
A
¶γχ
δ − δ
¶
| {z }
using (23) and (57)
=
1
G∗p
ρ
θ (p∗)2
(1− α)χ (w∗K)χ
QγχΩ2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ρ (1− β)χ
µ
r∗
A
¶γχ
+
µ
(1− β)χ
µ
r∗
A
¶γχ
−Ω
¶
| {z }µ
w∗
K
Q
¶ γ
1−γ
(1−α)χ from (23)
δ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
1
G∗p
ρ
θ (p∗)2
(1− α)χ (w∗K)χ
QγχΩ2
Ã
ρ (1− β)χ
µ
r∗
A
¶γχ
+ (1− α)χ δ
µ
w∗K
Q
¶ γ
1−γ
!
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where G∗p denotes the derivative of G (p, λ2,K1,K2) with respect to p from (35) evaluated at a
steady state. The sign of detJ∗ therefore depends on the sign of G∗p, which equals
G∗p = −
1
θ
1
p∗
− χ
C∗
⎛⎜⎝(1− α)χ (w∗K)γχ dWKdp
¯̄̄
p=p∗
(K∗1 +K∗2)− αχ
¡
w
γχ
L
¢
dWL
dp
¯̄̄
p=p∗
(L1 + L2)
QγχΩ
⎞⎟⎠
= − 1
p∗
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝1θ + χC∗
³
(1− α) (1− β) (w∗K)γ+1
´χ
(K∗1 +K∗2) +
³
αβw
γ+1
L
´χ
(L1 + L2)
(Ap∗)γχQγχΩ2| {z }
>0 (using (14)−(15))
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ (64)
which is trivially negative. Since the determinant of a matrix equals the product of its eigenvalues,
and since detJ∗ < 0 and by (55) one of the eigenvalues of J∗ equals ρ > 0, it must be the case that
the other two eigenvalues have opposite signs.¥
6.2. Analytical solution
To show that the model presented in section 2 with restrictions (45) generates a world’s constant
saving rate we first solve the closed economy Uzawa (1963) model of constant savings rates and
then demonstrate that the model presented in section two and the model with constant savings
rates are equivalent under the given restriction in parameter values.
Uzawa-Solow model closed economy.
We now solve the two-commodity closed economy model in which consumption and savings are
a constant fraction of total income as in Uzawa (1963). Consider an economy with Cobb-Douglas
production functions. To maximize profits, firms set
wUzK = αp
Uz Y
Uz
x
KUzx
= β
Y Uzc
KUzc
, wUzL = (1− α) pUz
Y Uzx
LUzx
= (1− β) Y
Uz
c
LUzc
(65)
(we have dropped the country subscript as we are, at the moment, solving for the case of a closed
economy). We use the superscript Uz to distinguish this model from the model presented in Section
2. Income Y Uz equals labor income plus capital income, as follows
Y Uz = wUzL L
Uz +wUzK K
Uz (66)
where LUz and KUz are the labor and capital stock of a closed economy, respectively. Following
Uzawa where a constant fraction of income is saved and a constant fraction of income is used for
consumption, we have
CUz = (1− s)Y Uz, savUz = sY Uz (67)
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where CUz denotes consumption, savUz stand for savings and s is a constant satisfying 0 < s < 1.
We now set savUz to be equal to the value of investment so that savUz = pUzY Uzx and use the
market clearing condition for the consumption good so that CUz = Y Uzc equation (65) then becomes
wUzK =
αsY Uz
KUzx
=
β (1− s)Y Uz
KUzc
, wUzL =
(1− α) sY Uz
LUzx
=
(1− β) (1− s)Y Uz
LUzc
(68)
Let 0 < ν < 1 be the (possible variable) fraction of total capital used in the production of the
investment good so that KUzx = νK
Uz, and let η be the fraction of total labor employed in the
production of the investment good equation (68) then becomes
wUzK = α
³ s
ν
´ Y Uz
KUz
= β
µ
1− s
1− ν
¶
Y Uz
KUz
, (69)
wUzL = (1− α)
µ
s
η
¶
Y Uz
LUz
= (1− β)
µ
1− s
1− η
¶
Y Uz
LUz
(70)
Since s is constant, (69) implies that v is also a constant equalling
α
³ s
ν
´
= β
µ
1− s
1− ν
¶
⇒ ν = αs
αs+ β (1− s) (71)
Note that the larger the capital intensity of the investment good is, the larger the fraction of capital
employed in the production of the investment good ν7. Similarly, η is also a constant equal to
(1− α)
µ
s
η
¶
= (1− β)
µ
1− s
1− η
¶
⇒ η = (1− α) s
(1− α) s+ (1− β) (1− s) . (72)
Since equation (71) indicates that the amount of capital KUzx used in the production of the invest-
ment good is a constant fraction of total capital, using the equation of motion of capital, similar to
that specified in (13) , we get
K̇Uz = Y Uzx − δKUz =
¡
νKUz
¢α
(ηL)1−α − δKUz (73)
Note that (73) is a Bernoulli differential equation that can be solved analytically to obtain the path
of capital KUz as follows
KUz (t) =
ÃÃ
K (0)1−α − Aν
α (ηL)1−α
δ
!
e−(1−α)δt +
Aνα (ηL)1−α
δ
! 1
1−α
(74)
7 ∂ν
∂α
α
ν
= v β
α
1−s
s
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Taking the limit of (74) as t goes to infinity, one obtains the result that capital converges in the
long run to
KUz∗ =
µ
Aνα
δ
¶ 1
1−α
ηL (75)
Using the market clearing condition for consumption, we obtain the consumption path
CUz (t) = Y UzC (t) = Q
¡
(1− ν)KUz (t)¢β ((1− η)L)1−β (76)
and, therefore, consumption grows at the rate
ĊUz
CUz
= β
K̇Uz
KUz
(77)
We now solve for the price of the investment good and labor wage rate in transition. Since KUzx =
νKUz, then
Y Uzx
KUzx
=
A
¡
νKUz
¢α
(ηL)1−α
νKUz
(78)
From the optimality conditions, it follows that
αpUz
Y Uzx
KUzx
= wUzK ⇒ αpUz
A
¡
νKUz
¢α
(ηL)1−α
νKUz
= wUzK (79)
The price of the investment and the labor wage rate from (14)− (15) therefore equal
pUz (t) =
Q̄
Ā
µ
α
1− α
ηL
νKUz (t)
¶α−β
, (80)
wUzL (t) = Q̄
µ
1− α
α
νKUz (t)
ηL
¶β
Substituting (80) into (79) , we obtain the path of wK which is given by
wUzK = Q̄
Ã
α
1− α
η
ν
L
K (t)Uz
!1−β
(81)
Ramsey-Uzawa-Solow equivalence.
We now show that the Uzawa-Solow two-sector model and the two-sector model with endogenous
savings rates are equivalent when
28
ρ = δ (α+ β (θ − 1))− δ, (82)
the restriction
α+ β (θ − 1) > 1 (83)
holds, and s = 1
θ
(where we require θ > 1). Setting s = 1
θ
, v (from (71)) equals
v =
α
α+ β (θ − 1) (84)
With the superscript Uz we denote the derivations that come from the Uzawa-Solow type model.
From (69) , income Y Uz equals ν
s
wUzK
α
KUz. Hence, Ẏ
Uz
Y Uz
=
ẇUzK
wUz
K
+ K̇
Uz
KUz
. Given that CUz = (1− s)Y Uz,
the following rates of change are equal
ĊUz
CUz
=
Ẏ Uz
Y Uz
=
ẇUzK
wUzK
+
K̇Uz
KUz
(85)
Since profits are maximized under the Uzawa-Solow setting, equation (14) also holds and therefore
ẇUzK
wUzK
= −
µ
1− β
β − α
¶
ṗUz
pUz
. (86)
Substituting (86) into (85) , we obtain
ĊUz
CUz
= −
µ
1− β
β − α
¶
ṗUz
pUz
+
K̇Uz
KUz
. (87)
From (80) it follows that
ṗUz
pUz
= (β − α) K̇
Uz
KUz
(88)
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Using (87) , (88) and adding and subtracting 1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
, we get
ĊUz
CUz
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
− ṗ
Uz
pUz
µ
1
θ
+
µ
1− β
β − α
¶¶
+
K̇Uz
KUz
(89)
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
− (β − α) K̇
Uz
KUz
µ
1
θ
+
µ
1− β
β − α
¶¶
+
K̇Uz
KUz
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
+
µ
θ − (β − α)− θ (1− β)
θ
¶
K̇Uz
KUz
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
+
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶
K̇Uz
KUz
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
+
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶µ
Y Uzx − δKUz
KUz
¶
using (73) (90)
From (69) we obtain Y
Uz
x
KUz
=
wUzK
pUz
ν
α
, and substituting this result into (90) yields
ĊUz
CUz
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
+
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶µ
wUzK
pUz
ν
α
− δ
¶
(91)
=
1
θ
ṗUz
pUz
+
ν
α
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶
wUzK
pUz
−
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶
δ
In the case of endogenous savings, (the model presented in section 2), the consumer Euler condition
is given by (5)
ĊR
CR
=
1
θ
ṗR
pR
+
1
θ
wRK
pR
− δ + ρ
θ
(92)
where the superscript R (Ramsey type model) is used to distinguish variables that come from the
model when savings rates are endogenous. Now, using
ρ = δ (α+ β (θ − 1))− δ (93)
from (45) and from (84) , it follows that
v =
α
α+ β (θ − 1) or
1
θ
=
v
α
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶
(94)
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to obtain
ĊR
CR
=
1
θ
ṗR
pR
+
1
θ
wRK
pR
−
µ
(α+ β (θ − 1))
θ
¶
δ (95)
=
1
θ
ṗR
pR
+
v
α
µ
α+ β (θ − 1)
θ
¶
wRK
pR
−
µ
(α+ β (θ − 1))
θ
¶
δ
=
ĊUz
CUz
¥
6.3. Proof of proposition 5
Let λ̂j = λjeρt. Taking the log time derivative of λ̂j and employing (4) , we get
·
λ̂j
λ̂j
=
λ̇j
λj
− ρ = −wK
p
+ δ. (96)
Integrating the consumers’ budget and using c−θj p = λ̂je
ρt (from (4)) and setting cj (t) = φjC (t) ,
we obtain
(97)
λ̂j (t)Kj = λ̂j (0)Kj (0) + φ
−θ
j
Z t
0
wL (τ)C (τ )
−θ e−ρτdτ − φ1−θj
Z t
0
C (τ)1−θ e−ρτdτ
To obtain φj, we first solve for the integrals in equation (97) . Note that since the world (aggre-
gate) economy behaves as a closed economy we can employ the results from the analytical solution
for the Uzawa-Solow type model. We use (76) and (80) to obtain
wLC
−θ = H−θQ̄
µ
1− α
α
ν
ηL
¶β
Kβ(1−θ)
Lθ(1−β)
(98)
where H = Q (1− ν)β (1− η)1−β , and
C1−θ = H1−θKβ(1−θ)L(1−β)(1−θ) (99)
Substituting (98) and (99) into (97) , we get
(100)
λ̂j (t)Kj = λ̂j (0)Kj (0) +
Ã
φ−θj
µ
1− α
α
ν
ηL
¶β
H−θQ̄
Lθ(1−β)
−
³
φjHL
1−β
´1−θ!Z t
0
K (τ)β(1−θ) e−ρτdτ
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Using (74) and (45) and integrating
R t
0 K (τ)
β(1−θ) e−ρτdτ, we getZ t
0
K (τ)β(1−θ) e−ρτdτ
=
Z t
0
⎛⎜⎝
⎛⎝
³
K (0)1−α − ¡KUz∗¢1−α´
e(1−α)δτ
+
¡
KUz∗
¢1−α⎞⎠
1
1−α
⎞⎟⎠
| {z }
K(τ) from (74)
β(1−θ)
e−ρτdt
=
Z t
0
³
K (0)1−α − ¡KUz∗¢1−α + ¡KUz∗¢1−α e(1−α)δτ´β(1−θ)1−α ∗
∗e
−ρ from (45)z }| {
(−δ (α+ β (θ − 1)) + δ)τ−δβ(1−θ)τdτ
=
Z t
0
³
K (0)1−α − ¡KUz∗¢1−α + ¡KUz∗¢1−α e(1−α)δτ´− ρ(1−α)δ−1 e(1−α)δτdτ
= −
³
K (0)1−α − ¡KUz∗¢1−α + ¡KUz∗¢1−α e(1−α)δτ´− ρ(1−α)δ
(KUz∗)1−α ρ
¯̄̄̄
¯̄̄
t
0
=
1
(KUz∗)1−α ρ
⎛⎜⎝ 1
K (0)
ρ
δ
− 1³
K (t)Uz
´ρ
δ
eρt
⎞⎟⎠ using (74) . (101)
Substituting (101) into (100) yields
λ̂j (t)Kj (t) = λ̂j (0)Kj (0) + (102)
+
Ã
Q̄
µ
1− α
α
ν
ηL
¶β
− φjHL(1−β)
!
φ−θj
HθLθ(1−β)ρ (KUz∗)1−α
Ã
1
K (0)
ρ
δ
− 1
K (t)
ρ
δ eρt
!
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Using cj (t)
−θ p (t) e−ρt = λ̂j (t) from (4) and setting cj (t) = φjC (t) , we get
λ̂j (t)Kj (t) = φ
−θ
j C (t)
−θ p (t) e−ρt (t)Kj (t) (103)
= φ−θj C (0)
−θ p (0)Kj (0) +
+
Ã
Q̄
µ
1− α
α
ν
ηL
¶β
− φjHL(1−β)
!
φ−θj
HθLθ(1−β)ρ (KUz∗)1−α
Ã
1
K (0)
ρ
δ
− 1
K (t)
ρ
δ eρt
!
.
Taking the limit as t approaches infinity and using the transversality condition, we obtain
0 = C (0)−θ p (0)Kj (0) +
µ
Q̄
³
1−α
α
ν
ηL
´β − φjHL(1−β)¶
HθLθ(1−β)ρ (KUz∗)1−αK (0)
ρ
δ
. (104)
Using the analytical solution for C and p (from (76) and (80)) yields
C (0)−θ p (0) =
K (0)β(1−θ)−α
HθLθ(1−β)
Q̄
Ā
µ
α
1− α
ηL
ν
¶α−β
(105)
substituting into (104) , using ρ
δ
= (α+ β (θ − 1)) − 1 (from (45)), setting KUz∗ = ¡Aνα
δ
¢ 1
1−α ηL
(from (75)) and solving for φj , we get
φj =
Q̄
HL
µ
1− α
α
ν
η
¶β µ
1 +
ρ
Ā
¡
KUz∗
¢1−α
Kj (0)K (0)
ρ
δ
+β(1−θ)−α
µ
α
1− α
ηL
ν
¶α¶
=
ββ (1− β)1−β
(1− ν)β (1− η)1−β
µ
ν
η
1− α
α
¶β µ
ρ
δ
η
1− α
Kj (0)
K (0)
+
1
L
¶
(106)
Adding φj for j = 1, 2, leads to the result
φ1 + φ2 = 1 =
ββ (1− β)1−β
(1− ν)β (1− η)1−β
µ
ν
η
1− α
α
¶β µ
ρ
δ
η
1− α + 1
¶
(107)
which implies
ββ (1− β)1−β
(1− ν)β (1− η)1−β
µ
ν
η
1− α
α
¶β
=
δ (1− α)
ρη + δ (1− α) (108)
From (45) , we obtain
33
−ρ
δ
1
(θ − 1) =
1− α
θ − 1 − β, (109)
Using s = 1
θ
, η, as defined in (72) , η therefore equals
η =
(1− α)
(1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1) (110)
Substituting for η into
δ(1−α)
ρη+δ(1−α) , we get
δ (1− α)
ρη + δ (1− α) =
(1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1)
(θ − 1) (111)
thus (106) becomes
φj =
δ (1− α)
ρη + δ (1− α)| {z }
using (108)
µ
ρ
δ
η
1− α
Kj (0)
K (0)
+
1
L
¶
(112)
=
(1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1)
(θ − 1)| {z }
using (111)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝ ρ(1− α) δ (1− α)(1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1)| {z }
using (110)
Kj (0)
K (0)
+
1
L
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
ρ
δ
1
(θ − 1)
Kj (0)
K (0)
+
(1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1)
(θ − 1)
1
L
=
ρ
δ
1
(θ − 1)
µ
Kj (0)
K (0)
− 1
L
¶
+
1
L
using (109) ¥
6.4. Proof of proposition 6
Let R (t) denote the net returns to capital at instant t, which equal the returns from renting
out a unit of capital
wK(t)
p(t) plus capital gains
ṗ(t)
p(t) minus the value loss of capital due to depreciation
34
δ. From (14) , (74) and (80) it follows that the net returns to capital with trade at instant t equal
RT (t) =
wTK (t)
pT (t)
+
ṗT (t)
pT (t)
− δ = w
T
K (t)
pT (t)
−K̇
T (t)
KT (t)
(α− β)| {z }
from (80)
− δ (113)
= αA
µ
ηL
νKT (t)
¶1−α
| {z }
from (79)
−
Ã
Aνα
µ
ηL
KT (t)
¶1−α
− δ
!
| {z } (α− β)
from (73)
− δ
= αA
µ
η
ν
L
KT (t)
¶1−α
−
ÃÃ
Aνα
δ
µ
ηL
KT (t)
¶1−α
− 1
!
(α− β) + 1
!
| {z }
Factoring δ
δ
We use the superscript T to indicate the trade scenario. As before, L = L1 + L2 holds and
KT = KT1 +K
T
2 is the world capital stock under trade. In autarchy (denoted by superscript A),
capital in country j evolves, similar to (74) , as follows
KAj (t) =
ÃÃ
Kj (0)
1−α − Aν
α (ηLj)
1−α
δ
!
e−(1−α)δt +
Aνα (ηLj)
1−α
δ
! 1
1−α
(114)
The ratio between the rental price of capital and the price of the investment good of country j in
autarchy
µ
wA
Kj
pAj
¶
equals
wAKj (t)
pAj (t)
= αA
Ã
ηLj
νKAj (t)
!1−α
(115)
Let
Kj(0)
Lj
>
Ki(0)
Li
. In autarchy, the net returns to the capital of country j equal RAj (t)
RAj (t) =
wAKj (t)
pAj (t)
+
ṗAj (t)
pAj (t)
− δ (116)
= α
Ã
η
ν
Lj
KAj (t)
!1−α
−
⎛⎝⎛⎝µνα
δ
¶Ã
ηLj
KAj (t)
!1−α
− 1
⎞⎠ (α− β) + 1
⎞⎠ δ
A similar expression holds for country i. From (114) one can readily verify that in autarchy, if
country j has a larger initial endowment of capital than country i 6= j, then country j will always
have a larger capital stock and both countries reach the same level of capital asymptotically as
time approaches infinity. Thus, since
Kj(0)
Lj
>
Ki(0)
Li
implies
KAj (t)
Lj
>
KAi (t)
Li
and from (116) the effect
35
of per-capita capital of country j on RAj equals (using (84)),
(1− α) η
µ
ν
η
¶αÃ
Lj
KAj (t)
!(1−α)Ã
Lj
KAj (t)
!³
−α
ν
+ (α− β)
´
| {z }
−βθ = from(84)
(117)
= − (1− α) η
µ
ν
η
¶αÃ
Lj
KAj (t)
!(1−α)Ã
Lj
KAj (t)
!
βθ < 0
(a similar expression holds for country i), then RAi (t) > R
A
j (t) . Note that in the case of trade, the
effect of world per-capita capital on RT equals
− (1− α) η
µ
ν
η
¶αµ
L
KT (t)
¶(1−α)µ
L
KT (t)
¶
βθ < 0 (118)
It only remains to show that RAi (t) > R
T (t) > RAj (t) . To show this from (113) and (116) it suffices
to show that
KAj (t)
Lj
>
KT (t)
L(t) =
KT1 (t)+K
T
2 (t)
L1+L2
>
KAi (t)
Li
. Since
Kj(0)
Lj
>
K1(0)+K2(0)
L1+L2
>
Ki(0)
Li
always holds,
using (74) and (114) it follows that
KAj (t)
Lj
>
KT (t)
L(t) =
KT1 (t)+K
T
2 (t)
L1+L2
>
KAi (t)
Li
also holds and, therefore,
RAi (t) > R
T (t) > RAj (t)¥
6.5. Proof of proposition 7
Let
Kj(0)
Lj
>
Ki(0)
Li
. Using (80) , in autarchy the labor wage rate of country j equals
wAj (t) = Q̄
Ã
1− α
α
νKAj (t)
ηLj
!β
, (119)
and a similar expression holds for country i 6= j. With trade, the labor wage rate equals
wT (t) = Q̄
µ
1− α
α
νKT (t)
ηL
¶β
(120)
since
KAj (t)
Lj
>
KT (t)
L(t) =
KT1 (t)+K
T
2 (t)
L1+L2
>
KAi (t)
Li
it follows that wAj (t) > w
T (t) > wAi (t).
6.6. Proof of proposition 8
Using (103) it can also be verified that
−λ̂j (t)Kj (t) =
Z ∞
t
³
wL (τ) cj (τ)
−θ − cj (τ)1−θ
´
e−ρτdτ (121)
=
Ãµ
1− α
α
ν
ηL
¶β φ−θj Q̄
HθL(1−β)θ
− φ
1−θ
j
H−1+θL(1−β)(θ−1)
!Z ∞
t
K (τ)β(1−θ) e−ρτdτ
36
or integrating using (74)
p (t)C (t)−θ e−ρt| {z }
λ̂j(t)/φ
−θ
j
Kj =
⎛⎜⎝HL(1−β)φj − Q̄
³
1−α
α
ν
ηL
´β
(KUz∗)1−α ρK (t)
ρ
δ eρt
⎞⎟⎠ 1
L(1−β)θHθ
(122)
Using (45), (76), (80) and (75) simplification leads to8
κj =
Kj (t)
K (t)
=
δ
ρ
1− α
η
µ
φj
µ
1− η
1− β
¶
− 1
L
¶
(123)
Hence, the ratio
Kj(t)
K(t) is constant for all t. Solving for φj, we obtain
φj =
µ
ρ
δ
η
1− ακj +
1
L
¶
1− β
1− η (124)
=
µ
ρ
δ
1
θ − 1
¶µ
κj (0)− 1
2
¶
+
1
2
¥ (125)
6.7. Proof of proposition 9
Per country income is given by
Yj = wLLj +wKKj (126)
= Q̄
µ
Lj +
α
1− α
η
ν
L
Kj (t)
K (t)
¶µ
1− α
α
ν
η
K (t)
L
¶β
= Q̄
µ
1− α
α
ν
η
¶β µ
Lj
L
+
α
1− α
η
ν
κj
¶
K (t)β L1−β
Since the ratio
Kj(t)
K(t) is constant, this implies that income in each country grows at the same rate
as aggregate (world) capital which, in turn, implies
Ẏj
Yj
= β
K̇
K
=
Ċ
C
=
ċj
cj
(127)
Since the consumption and income of country j grow at the same rate, the ratio
cj
Yj
≡ (1− sj)
is constant, that is, the consumption expenditure is a constant fraction of income. Using 1 =
8Notice that from (71)− (72)
α
β
µ
1− β
1− α
¶
=
ν
η
µ
1− η
1− ν
¶
37
β
α
1−α
1−β
ν
η
1−η
1−ν and H = Q (1− ν)β (1− η)1−β it can be shown that the consumption share of country
j equals
1− sj = cj
Yj
=
φjCj
Yj
=
(1− β)β
ββ
(1− ν)β
(1− η)β
αβ
(1− α)β
ηβ
νβ
φj (1− η)KUz (t)β L1−β
(1− β)
³
Lj +
α
1−α
η
ν
Lκj
´³
K(t)
L
´β
=
(1− η)
(1− β)
φj³
Lj
L
+ α1−α
η
ν
κj
´
=
³
Lj
L
+ ρ
δ
η
1−ακj
´
³
Lj
L
+ α1−α
η
ν
κj
´ (128)
which implies
sj =
η
1− α
α
ν
− ρ
δ³
Lj
L
K(0)
Kj(0)
+ α1−α
η
ν
´ (129)
=
η
1− α
1³
Lj
L
K(0)
Kj(0)
+ η1−α
δ+ρ
δ
´
=
η
1− α
1³
Lj
L
K(0)
Kj(0)
+ δ+ρ
δ(θ−1)−ρ
´
=
δ
Lj
L
K(0)
Kj(0)
(δ (θ − 1)− ρ) + δ + ρ
=
δ
[δ ((1− α) + (1− β) (θ − 1))]
³
Lj
L
K(0)
Kj(0)
´
+ δ + ρ
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